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Abstract

Umberto Eco’s 1988 novel Foucault’s Pendulum weaves together a wide range of
philosophical and literary threads. Many of these threads find their other ends in Eco’s
nonfiction works, which focus primarily on the question of interpretation and the source
of meaning. The novel, which follows three distinctly overinterpretive characters as they
descend into ruin, has been read by some as a retraction or parody of Eco’s own position.
However, if Foucault’s Pendulum is indeed polemical, it must be taken as an argument
against the mindset which Eco has termed the “hermetic”. Through an examination of his
larger theoretical body, it will be seen that Eco preserves his philosophical consistency
across his fictive and non-fictive work.
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Auctor in Fabula: Umberto Eco and the Intentio of Foucault’s Pendulum
Introduction
To define Umberto Eco seems, on first glance, an impossible task. Over a career
spanning nearly six decades, he has not carved a niche for himself as much as he has
extended his formidable shadow over Western semiotics and academia. Declared by
Jonathan Culler of Cornell University to be the world’s “most distinguished
representative” of the semiotic discipline (Culler 116), Eco has written extensively for
both technical and lay audiences. His expertise extends to aesthetics, popular culture,
literary criticism, comic books, philology, and medieval philosophy, establishing him as
one of contemporary Europe’s indisputable polymaths.
Together with his essays and lectures, Eco has achieved widespread notoriety
through his fiction. His 1980 debut, The Name of the Rose, became an international
bestseller, and was eventually adapted for the screen in a production starring Sean
Connery. His later novels—including Foucault’s Pendulum (1988), The Island of the Day
Before (1994), and The Mysterious Flame of Queen Loana (2004)—did not receive quite
the same reception, but Eco has built a large cult following nonetheless. His novels are as
distinctive as his nonfiction, filled with characters who struggle with contemporary
philosophical problems, employing a veritable encyclopedia of historical and literary
references, and driven by that “taste for whimsicality” which marks his personality (Eco,
Search for Perfect Language 4).
Whether writing for academics or for a lay audience, whether composing fictional
narratives or analytical essays, Eco returns to several topics in particular. Foremost
among these is the question of interpretation. The nature of texts, how they mean, and
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how much they can mean has been a concern of Eco’s since his 1962 book Opera aperta
(translated into English in 1989 as The Open Work). Since then, he has expounded his
nuanced brand of structuralism in academic works such as The Role of the Reader (1979),
Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language (1984), and The Limits of Interpretation
(1990). In recognition of his work in this field, Eco was invited to deliver the 1990
Tanner Lectures at Cambridge (Collini 1). Additionally, Eco has had a keen interest in
the history of semiotic philosophy, particularly in the thought of the classical and
medieval scholars. In 1979, before the International Association for Semiotic Studies, he
proposed several avenues for historiographic approaches to the topic. A large volume of
his own essays on the subject published in 2014 (From the Tree to the Labyrinth:
Historical Studies on the Sign and Interpretation) bears witness to his long devotion.
While universally respected, Eco is not always understood, particularly when it
comes to his fiction. During the previously-mentioned Tanner Lectures, the late Richard
Rorty (then of UVa) confessed to having conducted a particularly mistaken reading of
Foucault’s Pendulum. Acknowledging in the same breath that he had later changed his
mind regarding Eco’s purpose, Rorty described his first impression:
I decided that Eco must be satirizing the way in which scientists, scholars,
critics, and philosophers think of themselves as cracking codes, peeling
away accidents to reveal essence, stripping away veils of appearance to
reveal reality. I read the novel as anti-essentialist polemic, as a spoof of
the metaphor of depth[.] More specifically, I interpreted the novel as a
send-up of structuralism—of the very idea of structures which stand to
texts or cultures as skeletons to bodies, programs to computers, or keys to
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locks[.] I decided that Eco had managed to shrug off the diagrams and
taxonomies of his earlier work[;] he is willing at last to abandon his long
search for the Plan, for the code of codes. (“Progress” 89-91)
Such a reading could not survive the torrent of work which followed Foucault’s
Pendulum, which indisputably proved that Eco had not retracted anything; in his talk,
Rorty freely admitted the untenable nature of his interpretation (though, as a
philosophical pragmatist, would not admit to any mistake).
Though such an interpretation may be universally discarded (declared “incorrect”
by some, declared “not useful” by others), it would be well worth discovering what
makes this interpretation so appealing, even for a highly-educated philosopher and
literary theorist such as Rorty. Is the novel truly “polemic,” is Eco merely playing a 500page prank on his readers, or is something else going on? And if the novel makes an
argument, what argument does it make? An exploration of the novel in the context of
Eco’s other writings can settle this question beyond any reasonable doubt. Foucault’s
Pendulum is indeed an argumentative book, but one that argues against a philosophy
which Eco, far from espousing, has rather attacked throughout his career:
overinterpretation and the hermetic mindset. Establishing this thesis requires an overview
of Eco’s hermetic targets, a description of both Eco’s and Rorty’s philosophical positions,
and, finally, a careful reading of the novel itself.
Eco’s History of Interpretive Drift
As close to a manifesto as Eco has ever written, his 1990 lecture series (to which
Rorty’s talk was a response) laid out his core conception of the attitude towards the
physical and textual world which he has labeled “hermetic” (Eco, “Unlimited Semiosis”
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28). This attitude is characterized on the one hand by a sort of flippancy toward
interpretation and the meaning of a text (for the text or symbol can represent anything)
and on the other hand by a dead seriousness with regard to the idea that truth that may be
found in deep layers of signification (for it also must represent something). Paradoxical,
yes, but Eco’s definition of the hermetic clearly marks it as contrary to normal logic (Eco,
“Interpretation and History” 29). A believer in what Eco terms “interpretive drift” (Eco,
“Unlimited Semiosis” 26), that is, the continual deferral of meaning via symbolic
processes, the hermetic thinker operates under a hermeneutic of suspicion, clinging to the
non-falsifiable belief that ultimate truth is just outside his grasp.
Eco’s historical research traces elements of this mindset as far back as the Grecian
scholars, whose concern with the bounds of reason was paired with other aspects of their
culture which were “fascinated by infinity” (Eco, “Interpretation and History” 29).
According to Eco, the same civilization which produced Aristotelian logic was
simultaneously absorbed with the possibility of a deep and secret gnw'si" 1 beyond the
reach of methodical reason, which could unlock the world’s hidden meanings. Even as
science and rationality made great strides, the mystery cults of Isis and Mithras flourished
across the Hellenic and Roman worlds (Magness 162), enticing followers with the
promise of secrets.
This search for secret knowledge, Eco says, was spurred by a desire to uncover
the hidden correspondences underlying apparent contradictions, and was enabled by a
readiness to understand texts as inherently symbolic, carrying deeper signification than
what is visible on the surface. In these circles, the importance of rational thought as an

1

“Knowledge”; the root of English “gnostic” and “gnosticism”
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avenue to truth was downplayed, with revelatory visions and epiphanies elevated in its
place: “truth becomes identified with what is not said [and] must be understood beyond
or beneath the surface of a text” (Eco, “Interpretation and History” 30). The interpretive
faculties become vitally important in these philosophical religions, as it is only through
hypothesizing deep structures connecting phenomena that something closer to true
meaning may be found.
These ancient philosophies of the anti-rational reached their apogee in the second
century A.D., in a relatively peaceful, tolerant society, where Roman mixed with Greek,
and Cretan with Phrygian, and where even deities could become fluid—for example,
Ceres could also be identified as Demeter, or Rhea, or Cybele, all harvest goddesses who
were once separated by religion and race. Enough was known concerning both the world
of cultures and the physical world for syncretism to limitlessly combine and conflate
anywhere that similarities were found. In the mystical collection Corpus Hermeticum of
the second and third centuries (from which the label “hermetic” is derived), the gnostic
creed, “that which is below is like that which is above” (Newton 3), made its first
appearance, codifying the idea that perceived correspondences in sense, quality, or
likeness—particularly between lower, earthly things and higher, heavenly things—were
indicative of the cosmic structure. Initiates desired, along with narrator Hermes
Trismegistus, to “learn the things that are, and comprehend their nature” (“Poemandres”).
Much of the appeal of grasping this deep structure was the promise of power to those
who knew the mysterious means by which the stars influenced the events of earth.
Although many original texts were lost during the collapse of the Roman Empire,
medieval Neo-Platonists carried the torch of hermeticism through the majority of the
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Middle Ages, as writers such as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and other apophatic
theologians argued that the One “is so distant from us that [. . .] he must be spoken of
through metaphors and allusions, [and] contrasting expressions” (Eco, “Absolute and
Relative” 27). John Scotus Eriugena (whose De divisione naturae was itself an influential
piece of mystic-philosophical synthesis) made the assertion in the ninth century that
“there is, I believe, no visible or corporal thing that does not signify something” (Eco,
“On Symbolism” 145). For all of these Christian writers, the concept of a world whose
elements did not interrelate and mutually signify was the height of absurdity. Thomas
Aquinas himself quoted Pseudo-Dionysius as an authoritative source in his Summa
Theologica in defense of deep symbolic readings of Scripture, saying: “impossibile est
nobis aliter lucere divinum radium nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum” 2
(Summa I Q. 1 Art. 9). The world was, to these scholars, “liber scriptus digito dei” 3
(Hugh of St. Victor, quoted in Eco, “On Symbolism” 145), which required strenuous
interpretation to understand.
The rediscovery of many classical texts at the time of the Renaissance infused
new life into hermetically-minded scholarship, spurring what James Heiser has called the
Hermetic Reformation (Heiser). Pico della Mirandola, Marcilio Ficino, and others
regained access to Plato’s full corpus, as well as the reunited Hermeticum, allowing them
to re-introduce the unadulterated forms of Greek and Gnostic thought into mainstream
dialogues. The result was a culture which fostered a mindset “based on the principles of
analogy and sympathy, according to which every item of the furniture of the world is

2

“It is impossible that the divine ray should shine on us, unless enveloped in various
sacred veils.” (Note: all translations are the author’s.)
3
“A book written by the finger of God.”
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linked to every other element” (Eco, “Unlimited Semiosis” 24). Along with philosophical
innovation, Europe also saw the birth of a wide interest in alchemical studies. The
Hermeticum continued to promise (in symbolic form) the secrets of the world, but now
the nature of these secrets were commonly interpreted through a more scientific lens.
As Enlightenment philosophy began to hold a new sway over accepted
scholarship and dialogue, European mysticism declined, but other methods of deep
interpretation came into vogue. Secret societies such as the Freemasons became
extremely popular—as did the pastime of speculating about their doings and connections
to historical figures. One of Eco’s key examples of historically-oriented text-mining is
that of Gabriele Rossetti, trying in the 1830s to prove the heretical origins of Dante’s
Divine Comedy by searching for Masonic and Rosicrucian symbols in the text (Eco,
“Overinterpreting Texts” 55-9). Dante, evidently, was considered a valuable authority
(perhaps due in part to his own multifaceted theory of interpretation); there were attempts
throughout the Reformation and Enlightenment to claim him for Protestants or for Roman
Catholicism—one theory even that argued he prophesied the advent of Luther in
Purgatorio (Friederich 49). Yet, by this period the impulse to seek out the secret
correspondences of the earth had almost completely disappeared. Greater scientific
knowledge, combined with the rise of nominalist philosophy, had largely discouraged
any attempts at finding truth in hypothesized structures of the external cosmos.
This progression away from interpretation of the world and more exclusively into
interpretation of texts was finally cemented with the rise of phenomenology in the
beginning of the twentieth century. Once Husserl, Heidegger, and their fellows finally
divorced meaning from the external world and located it within the linguistic structures
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of the mind, literary theory and philosophy of language found a new significance in
Western thought. Suddenly, unspooling the structure of language was central to saying
anything about people or the world: “it is not as though we have meanings, or
experiences, which we then proceed to cloak with words; we can only have the meanings
and experiences in the first place because we have a language to have them in” (Eagleton
52). Since then, it has become passé to speak confidently of a shared reality to which
thoughts correspond (as in Aquinas’ definition of truth [Summa I Q. 21 Art. 2]); rather,
communities have shared linguistic constructions through which individuals organize
their perceptions.
As a result, Western literary theory developed a new focus on how much a text
can be thought to say—or whether a text could “say” at all. Structuralists generated metatheories of narratology and semiology, New Critics declared the key to decoding texts
was idiosyncratic to each, and later Deconstruction would seek to expose holes in
proposed structures. Eco argues that, despite their theoretical differences, scholars from
each discipline are capable of deep interpretive enterprises using “the same technique” of
selective coherence as the mystics (Eco, “Unlimited Semiosis” 28). Eco cites Yale
Deconstructionist Geoffrey Hartman’s reading of Wordsworth’s “A Slumber Did My
Spirit Seal” to illustrate this phenomenon: Hartman analyzes the poem under the
assumption that it must be saying more than is on the surface (Eco, “Overinterpreting
Texts” 60-2). Eco has little problem with this hypothesis, but disagrees with Hartman’s
method, which eschews any rule of selecting which poetic elements are significant and
which are not (61). Hartman judges his reading as valid purely on the grounds of its
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apparent coherence, without first arriving at a rule to govern which data are significant
and which are not.
This reliance on selective coherence is, in fact, the uniting factor among all these
disparate thinkers. Whether speculating on the hierarchies of the Kabbalistic Sephirot or
on the unvoiced words of a text, whether comfortable with interpretive drift because of a
firm belief in an Absolute or because of a firm belief in the absence of an Absolute, all of
these thinkers operate under a certain amount of confirmation bias, accepting only those
data which support their extra-textual hypotheses and declining to acknowledge when
little or no support is found. For example, when Rossetti proposes the three mirrors of
Paradiso, Canto II, to be an allusion to the triangularly-oriented lights of Masonic ritual,
he renders the other references to light in the canto incomprehensible, whereas if they are
considered through the lens of medieval optic science, all parts of the text become
mutually supportive (Eco, “Overinterpreting Texts” 59). Likewise, when it was shown
that elements of Platonic thought appear in the Corpus Hermeticum, the automatic
response of the Renaissance Hermetic was to believe that the Hermeticum (which must
be presupposed as ancient) influenced Plato, despite any historical or philological
evidence of the reverse (Eco, “Two Models of Interpretation” 19). All of this
uneconomical “use” of texts (Eco, “Intentio Lectoris” 57), this “beating” them into a
useful tool (Rorty, “Consequences” 151), and particularly this readiness to assume and
seek out a deeper, hidden truth behind the veil of the surface meaning is a readerly habit
which Eco has written extensively against throughout his career, which he has labeled
with the blanket term “hermeticism,” and which is the primary focus of Foucault’s
Pendulum.
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Unlimited Semiosis vs. Infinite Semiosis: The Peircean Factor
As Rorty discovered, however, to recognize Eco’s targets is not in itself sufficient
to understand Foucault’s Pendulum. Grasping the complete cause of Rorty’s misreading
requires a fuller understanding of where Eco and Rorty both stand in relation to other
contemporary literary theorists, as both scholars have carefully-constructed philosophical
positions which influence how they categorize themselves and each other.
Any attempt at placing Eco or Rorty on a philosophical map must take into
account the work of Charles Sanders Peirce. Despite having taken Peirce’s ideas in very
different directions, both Eco and Rorty have been vocal about their shared intellectual
heritage: Eco has cited Peirce consistently and extensively since his 1976 A Theory of
Semiotics (15), while one of Rorty’s most famous monographs was The Consequences of
Pragmatism. Peirce, the originator of American Pragmatism (Dewey 709), was the first
to codify the idea that the meaning of a hypothesis and the consequences of a hypothesis
were inseparably related. In Peirce’s calculus, “it reflects badly on the content of a
hypothesis if no consequences can be derived from it” (Misak 3). Only the consequences,
or uses, of an idea can define its meaning.
Peirce, a widely-recognized scientist and logician, used this fundamental theorem
of pragmatic philosophy to construct an epistemology centered on a progressive approach
to truth. On one hand, he was adamant about the necessity of fallibilism (the readiness to
rethink any belief in the face of new evidence or experience); on the other hand, he
believed that truth is approachable “through the continual correction [of] knowledge”
(Eco, “Absolute and Relative” 34). For Peirce, to understand a proposition is to grasp the
consequences of it being true or untrue. However, as consequences can only be
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hypothesized, nothing can be truly known in its fullness. Through the slow, communal
process of abducing propositions to fit human experiences (and later discarding them
when better hypothesis occur), the human community as a whole advances towards truth.
As pragmatism continued being articulated through John Dewey, William James,
and others of Peirce’s successors, the idea that this hypothetic process grows closer to
truth was abandoned as unnecessary baggage. By the time James published his volume
Pragmatism in 1907, he was of the opinion that “you can say of [a true statement] either
that ‘it is useful because it is true’ or that ‘it is true because it is useful.’ Both these
phrases mean exactly the same thing” (James, Pragmatism 98). This is evidence of a
progression even in James’ thought: in his 1885 lecture “The Function of Cognition,” he
had not yet fully developed his idea of truth as equivalent with usefulness, though his
divorce between metaphysical speculation and the analysis of mental “percepts” was
already clearly articulated (James, “Function of Cognition” 31-2). As Pragmatist theory
developed parallel to modern psychology and phenomenology, the metaphysical category
of truth came to be considered entirely superfluous, subsumed into a truncated
epistemology. If man can speak only of the events which occur within his own mind, it
appears useless to create non-falsifiable theories concerning things beyond.
Richard Rorty, as an avowed heir to the Pragmatist tradition, follows more in the
path of James than of Peirce. While claiming Peirce as an early influence (Rorty,
“Progress” 93), Rorty rejects truth as a metaphysical entity, and with it Peirce’s
conception of the aim of investigation: “For all his genius [. . .] Peirce himself remained
the most Kantian of thinkers—the most convinced that philosophy gave us an allembracing ahistorical context” (Rorty, Consequences 161). For Rorty, philosophical
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investigation can speak only within human contexts and vocabularies, and cannot brook
hypostatization (or, as James himself put it, “vicious abstractionism” [“Abstractionism
and ‘Relativismus’” 135]) of such things as “‘truth’, ‘knowledge’, ‘language’, [or]
‘morality’” (Rorty, Consequences 162). The only things worth attempting to discuss are
the consequences and uses of ideas or actions. As this is the case, all theoretical attempts
(such as Eco’s) to talk about interpretive enterprises in terms of better or worse are futile,
and ultimately wastes of intellectual energy.
Eco, conversely, seized on the semiotic facet of Peircean philosophy as his
starting point. Though Peirce is often paired with Saussure as a joint father of the
semiotic discipline, Peirce’s concept of signification was unique. He argued that
representation was fundamentally triadic, composed of three parts: the sign, the object,
and what he named the interpretant (Misak 16). The sign is the phenomenon which stands
in place of; the object is that which is replaced by the sign; and the interpretant is a
concept or rule which allows the sign to stand in for the object and renders the sign
intelligible by the recipient. This interpretant, “the idea to which [the sign] gives rise”
(Peirce 171), is the key distinctive of Peirce’s semiotic theories. According to Peirce, the
interpretant, as an idea, should itself be taken as a sign (Eco, A Theory of Semiotics 166),
but this operation opens up an extraordinary sequence of signification. The interpretantas-sign must also have its own interpretant, but that interpretant is itself a sign and also
requires an interpretant; in proposing this recursive sequence, Peirce allows for the
possibility of infinite depth and nuance in each sign.
The “infinite chain of interpretation” (Misak 19) precipitated from the Peircean
interpretant has been adopted by several schools of thought. Derrida, for example, used it
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as part of his justification for removing the idea of the “transcendental signified” from his
philosophy (Derrida 20). If, as Peirce has it, there is an infinite regression of signification,
then “from the moment there is meaning, there are nothing but signs” (50). Without a
central transcendental signified, a primum signatum for all signs to eventually refer back
to, Derrida can replace it with his concept of “play,” in which all language becomes
ultimately inconsistent and self-defeating by default.
Like Derrida, Eco uses the concept of the Peircean interpretant, but, unlike him,
Eco does not jettison the functionality of language—or its capability to bring its users
closer to truth. In his view, the successive signification will always be governed by
culturally-instituted codes, which connect disparate “cultural units” (Eco, A Theory of
Semiotics 66). These cultural units, when imported into a semiotic theory, can be equated
to sememes (Schneider 18). They function like quanta of meaning, embodying concepts
with which individuals may or may not have empirical experience, based on the shared
cultural knowledge they have access to. Eco cites Schneider’s definition of cultural units
to demonstrate the flexibility of the term: “a unit [. . .] is simply anything that is culturally
defined and distinguished as an entity” (Schneider 2). These entities may be as disparate
as “Empedocles” and “Seychelles,” or as narrowly separated as “U.S. President” and
“Barack Obama.” These units will also be subject to history and geography, as different
cultures will have different definitions for units: the components of unit “Barack Obama”
will differ widely depending on whether the language user is a member of American,
French, or Iraqi culture—and some cultures (e.g., the Huaorani) may not have this unit at
all.
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The cultural units are arranged according to shared cultural codes—the unspoken
habits by which individuals can automatically associate the unit “Disney” with the unit
“mouse” and the unit “castle,” and can allow each to symbolize another. These codes
determine which directions are easiest for the process of signification to operate in: they
establish the grain of the semiotic universe. For example, a language-user can
hypothetically use “dust” as a metonym for “currency,” but unless there is already an
established connection between the two units, “dust” will make far more sense to a
Western reader as a symbol, metaphor, or metonym for “body,” “impurity,” or “age.” For
Eco, the sign-as-interpretant process may proceed into a potential infinity, but it is an
anisotropic infinity: an infinity of nuance rather than an infinity of possibility. To
illustrate this distinction, Eco has adopted the terms “infinite semiosis” to describe the
free, undirected semiotic activity of Derrida et al., and “unlimited semiosis” to describe
his own more tame, directed concept (“Unlimited Semiosis” 28).
This semiotic stance turns into an interpretive one with the addition of one more
Peircean idea: that “a sememe is in itself an inchoate text, whereas a text is an expanded
sememe” (Eco, “Peirce and the Semiotic Foundations of Openness” 175). Although Eco
also cites Tzvetan Todorov, Teun van Dijk, and Algirdas Greimas as supports in the
introduction to The Role of the Reader, this concept is easiest understood as a simple
extension of Barthes’ dictum that “le récit est une grande phrase” 4 (4). Writing in
reference to structural analysis of narratives, Barthes’ argument was that a large text
embodies all the levels and relations of a simpler sentence. Both he and Eco stand
together on this point: that, whether in narratology or in semiotics, the largest unit of the

4

“The narrative is a large sentence.”
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system bears all the characteristics, contains all the depth, and retains all the possibilities
of the smaller units—and vice versa. Larger narratives have lost nothing by becoming
more complex than shorter ones (“[L]’art ne connaît pas le bruit [. . .] il n’y a jamais
unité perdue” 5 [Barthes 7]), and larger signs likewise lose nothing in their complexity.
Texts are signs, and signs are texts.
Bearing in mind that texts and signs should not be considered in opposition to
each other, it becomes clear that the prime difference between larger texts and more
nucleic signs is at the same time a similarity: both are governed by systems of coding
which dictate the best methods of interpretation. The difference is that while all texts and
signs should be read according to human cultural codes and habits, the internal
complexity of a larger text gives rise to the possibility of connecting internal patterns and
references. Under these circumstances, the text becomes its own governor, as a selfcontained, miniature Saussurian parole. Levels of intertextual context suddenly become
evident; units within the text begin to reflect one another and become symbols; the text
(to a large degree) becomes self-defining, self-interpreting, and self-sufficient.
Here, in this point of textual self-actualization, lie Eco’s own contributions to
textual theory. Needing a way to describe how the text becomes its own interpreter by
setting up its own linear context, Eco introduces the idea of intentio operis, the intent of
the work. Referencing classic concepts of the intentio auctoris and intentio lectoris, the
intent of the work is, essentially, a simple way to denote the ability of the text to define
itself. Paired with it is Eco’s concept of the Model Reader: the reader which a text intends
to create over the course of a reading. As he put it in “Joyce, Semiosis, and Semiotics”:

5

“Art does not know noise [. . .] Unity is never lost.”

AUCTOR IN FABULA

19

Independent of any alleged intention of the author is the intention of the
text. But a text exists only as a physical object, as a Linear Text
Manifestation. It is possible to speak of text intentions only as the result of
a conjecture on the part of the reader. The initiative of the reader basically
consists in making a conjecture about the text intention. A text is a device
conceived in order to produce its Model Reader. (148)
For Eco, interpretations of texts are generated by readers—but these readers will have
interacted with the text during their reading. The text, thus, is acting on its readers to
cause them to generate interpretations. It can do so by playing with their cultural
expectations, by drawing internal connections, or by referencing other texts.
Rejecting both authorial and readerly intent can confuse critics, but Eco’s focus is
always on the text as real object: “the text [. . .] is a linguistic strategy which is supposed
to trigger an interpretation” (“Small Worlds” 66). A discussion of authorial intent must
limit itself to examining the relationship between the conceptualized work in the author’s
mind and the “Linear Text Manifestation” that is preserved on the page, while a
discussion of the reader’s intent should be primarily concerned with the knowledge and
training he or she brings to the reading. Good interpretation should have nothing to do
with either the author’s or reader’s intent; rather, it should focus on the ways and means
by which the text provokes the mind of the reader to generate meaning.
Retaining the potential infinities of the Peircean interpretant, while still holding to
a system of semiotic and interpretive governance, Eco stands in a rather unique position
among literary theorists. On one hand, he is open-minded regarding the possibilities of
the text; on the other, he has a fairly solid structural framework for critiquing the quality
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of interpretations. The essentialism he holds to is both nuanced and historicist, subject to
shifting cultural definitions, but it remains indisputably a form of essentialism.
To sum up, then: despite a shared philosophical heritage, from the perspective of
Richard Rorty’s radical Pragmatism, Eco’s structural theories look functionally identical
to those of the mystics or hermetics. Having cut himself off from any vestiges of
essentialism, Rorty lumps together all attempts to find the “truth” of a text (or even to set
criteria for better interpretations) as naïve: “the thought that a commentator has
discovered what a text is really doing—[. . .] rather than merely being capable of being
used for these purposes—is, for us pragmatists, just more occultism” (Rorty, “Progress”
103). Confronted with Eco’s various structural theories of signification and interpretation,
combined with the adoption of unlimited semiosis, Rorty fails to distinguish between Eco
and deconstruction, or Eco and hermeticism. From Eco’s perspective, however, there is a
very key distinction between theorists that claim texts can support any interpretation, and
those (like himself) who argue for interpretations that respect the structure and intentions
of the text. From such a standpoint, he is capable of attacking hermetic drift in Foucault’s
Pendulum without contradicting or betraying his own stance.
The Hermetics and the Pendulum
Having established Eco’s thoughts on the nonfictional hermetic mindset and his
theory on what constitutes good interpretation, what remains is to examine Foucault’s
Pendulum itself, to see how well the hypothesis regarding its intentio fits the data. Recall
that the hypothesis is this: Foucault’s Pendulum provokes the well-read reader to use his
or her knowledge of the historical debates on interpretation to inform the rest of the
novel. Should the hypothesis be correct, a reading of the novel should discover a distinct
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and sustained conflict between Eco’s categories of the hermetic and the realistic. The
remainder of this paper will argue that this conflict is not only found in Foucault’s
Pendulum, but actually defines the novel’s intent.
With all due respect to Ted Gioia, who labeled it “one of the most grand and
complicated plots in modern fiction,” Foucault’s Pendulum requires only some small
amount of reconstruction to analyze. Despite the media res opening and flashback-heavy
narrative, it is relatively straightforward overall. Whether it has more than one
protagonist is debatable. Casaubon serves as narrator, though Eco labeled Jacopo Belbo
the protagonist in the first of his 1993 Norton Lectures (“Six Walks” 9), but the story
limits itself for the most part to a single narrative strand. That strand follows Belbo,
Casaubon, and Diotavelli, three Milanese editors whose knowledge of occult theories and
secret societies draw them into the anti-rational fantasies that they once ridiculed.
Casaubon, as mentioned, is narrator: the events are related and organized from his
perspective. The majority of his observations center on his own experiences with the
occult and hermetic worlds, and are augmented by the diary entries Belbo records on his
computer, Abulafia. Casaubon’s narration swings back and forth from past to present and
back again, as he spends a night hiding in Paris’ Musée des Arts et Métiers reminiscing
about the events which led him to this climactic evening. By sustaining this dual timeline,
the novel allows him to comment on those events from the later, wiser point of view. It is
largely through this commentary that the philosophical progression is revealed.
The plot traces the path that the three editors walk from naïveté into experience,
from wholesomeness into unwholesomeness, from realism into a vertiginous labyrinth of
signification. If Foucault’s Pendulum can be read as anything, it should be read as a case
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study in the seductiveness of the hermetic mindset. The novel exhibits three primary
evidences supporting this reading: an explicit and consistent slide into illogical and
unsupported interpretation; specific manifestations of the hermetic practice, which
engross and fascinate the characters; and, lastly, clear contrasts between overly-ambitious
interpretive acts and economical interpretive acts.
The book’s fabula begins early in Casaubon’s life, during his years studying
philology and Templar history at the University of Milan (Pendulum 45). Through his
social circle, he falls in with Belbo and Diotavelli, editors at Garamond Publishers.
Casaubon begins working with them, using his research training to help them sort the
useless manuscripts from the publishable. At this point in their careers, the characters,
while aware of the conspiratorial way of thought, look on it with a certain amount of
hauteur. When Casaubon, during his thesis research, first discovers the wide body of
work attempting to trace the occult and mystical history of the Templars, the “visionary
excess offended [his] incredulity, and [he] resolved to waste no more time on these
hunters of secrets” (46). In 1972, at Belbo’s request, he makes his first visit to Garamond
to look over a manuscript on the Templars. The book proves to be by one of the “hunters
of secrets,” and the three men share an extended conversation on the history of the
Templar trials—and the fanciful beliefs some hold regarding the events. Belbo concludes
the conversation with a comment on the credulity of the masses: “The whole thing is a
twisted syllogism. Act like a lunatic and you will be inscrutable forever. [. . .] Whenever
a poet or preacher, chief or wizard spouts gibberish, the human race spends centuries
deciphering the message” (90). Though conscious of and in contact with the world of
conspiracies and radical occultism, the main characters have distanced themselves from
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it. Their work is to reject the illogical and fanciful as unfit for publication or
consumption.
All this changes, however, when Casaubon is hired and initiated into the workings
of Manutius Press, Garamond’s lesser-known sister. Manutius, originally for the purpose
of fleecing self-published authors, is in the process of being transformed by Signor
Garamond (owner of both presses) into an avenue for making money on the multitudes of
conspiracy theorists. By publishing an extended series of books purporting to constitute
an authoritative encyclopedia of occult mysteries, Garamond muses, the company can
draw a consistent profit from the gullible: “It’s a gold mine, all right. I realized that these
people will gobble up anything that’s hermetic, as you put it, anything that says the
opposite of what they read in their books at school” (Pendulum 219). Dubbed “Project
Hermes,” this enterprise will occupy Belbo, Casaubon, and Diotavelli for most of the
remainder of the novel, as they work to research all the disparate and esoteric branches of
occult theories, and field manuscripts from the “Diabolicals” (their term for the writers of
such works) who come to know about the project.
All goes well with the project up to the point at which the editors decide to have a
little fun at the expense of their clients. After some time of immersion in the world of the
Diabolicals, Casaubon is jaded enough to jest, “There exists a secret society with
branches throughout the world, and its plot is to spread the rumor that a universal plot
exists” (Pendulum 265). At the same time, however, a research visit to observe some
mystical rites raises as many questions as it answers. Alone, Casaubon muses: “It was
becoming harder for me to keep apart the world of magic and what today we call the
world of facts. [. . .] I began to question everything[,] asking them to tell [me] another,
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deeper story, which surely they were hiding” (300). It is in this frame of mind that he and
the other two editors begin disposing with even the loosest concept of intellectual
integrity by inventing their own pseudo-conspiracy.
Spurred by a joke about dropped folders re-enacting the practice of Kabbalah,
Casaubon is suddenly struck with an idea—a golden opportunity to generate further
books for the Manutius clientele. He eagerly explains to his compatriots:
What if you fed [the computer] a few dozen notions taken from the works
of the Diabolicals—for example, the Templars fled to Scotland, or the
Corpus Hermeticum arrived in Florence in 1460—and threw in a few
connective phrases like “It’s obvious that” and “This proves that”? We
might end up with something revelatory. Then we fill in the gaps, call the
repetitions prophecies, and—voila—a hitherto unpublished chapter of the
history of magic. (311)
The three immediately set about combining various propositions: first randomly, on
Belbo’s workplace computer, Abulafia, and then intentionally, as they begin fitting larger
pieces together. After so long dealing with mediocre writers and the drudge of repeated
theories, they find a certain thrill in creation. Diotavelli remarks, “We are reconstructing
the history of the world. [. . .] We are rewriting the Book. I like it” (336-7). Before long,
the new conspirators have a rapidly-growing theory that involves Templars, Rosicrucians,
Nazis, telluric currents, Gnosticism, Hollow Earth Theory, the Protocols of the Elders of
Zion, the lost city of Agarttha, and—of course—the Pendulum of Léon Foucault.
The game begins to collapse once Belbo, naively expecting no consequences,
reveals the basics of the falsified Plan to one of the Diabolicals. Suddenly, he receives
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mysterious threats from unknown sources, is framed in a terrorist scare, and finally is
kidnapped. Casaubon travels to Paris in search of his associate, terrified by the
implication that the pseudo-Plan, or aspects of it, may in fact be true. When he arrives in
Paris, the swinging narrative stills its motion as he concludes his long night of
reminiscing. His vigil inside the Musée eventually sees a great gathering of occult
followers from multiple secret societies. This convocation and séance climaxes with the
ritual murder of Belbo at his refusal to give the Diabolicals the key to the Plan, which
they have assumed to be true. After a deranged encounter with the Eiffel Tower (“foul
metal spider” [Pendulum 502]), Casaubon escapes the city, clearly out of his wits, and
travels into the Piedmont countryside to await the bloodthirsty plotters.
The progression from logic to irrationality, from well-substantiated belief to
gullible derangement, is clearly evident—even in the words the editors use to talk about
their endeavors. Even when the Game is still very much for fun, Casaubon recognizes
that he must start thinking like a Diabolical to put together a Plan: “If you move in the
refined time of revelation, do not follow the fussy, philistine chains of logic. [. . .] Having
no grid [to act as structure], I had to assume the existence of one. I had to read with
mistrust” (Pendulum 328). As the project continues, the joke becomes more and more
real, and the pranksters find themselves drawn deeper and deeper into the mire. Even
while Casaubon and Belbo joke about “strict scholarship, above all” (433), a deeper
“sickness” is taking hold of their reason (433), causing them to question their deepest
principles. Belbo’s diary entries during this time reveal a growing religious and
philosophical crisis:
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If belief is absolutely necessary, let it be [. . .] a religion out of joint,
fuming, subterranean, without an end. [. . .] But if there is no cosmic Plan?
What a mockery, to live in exile when no one sent you there. [. . .] When
religion fails, art provides. You invent the Plan, metaphor for the
Unknowable One. [. . .] To create an immense hope that can never be
uprooted, because it has no root. [. . .] Why write novels? Rewrite history.
The history that then comes true. (434)
Belbo, the agnostic, finds the comfort of belief to be an intense temptation. In a world
where possible structures continually present themselves, might it not be better to live as
though they were true? The meaning-seeking and meaning-imposing that Eco has written
about elsewhere is weighed by Belbo as a path to solace—rather than the endless hunger
that it becomes. By the night of the Parisian showdown, hermetic methods have deeply
poisoned the thinking of each of the main characters.
Two clear phenomena that draw solid connections between the interpretive habits
spoken of in Eco’s nonfiction and the characters of Foucault’s Pendulum are the
Kabbalah and the power of fakes. Eco has written at some length on each of these topics:
in The Search for the Perfect Language, as well as in other essays, he has talked about
the nature and possibilities of Kabbalistic philosophy and techniques; in the essays of
Travels in Hyperreality and elsewhere, he has discussed the mysterious power of the
falsehood—as well as a theory of fakes, copies, and counterfeits. Both of these subjects
are central themes of Foucault’s Pendulum—to the point that much of the book will be
incomprehensible without at least a basic understanding.
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Kabbalah, as a practical discipline and a philosophy of language, grew up in the
Middle Ages and maintained a distinct presence in the small but persistent community of
Jewish scholars. Drawing first from the idea that the words of God created the world, and
second from the idea that Hebrew was undoubtedly the language which God used, they
developed a system of thought that looked for truth and power in the structures of
Hebrew itself. While Christian theory of the time broke down meanings into several ways
of reading a text, Kabbalistic readers actually changed the expression of the text in the
search for the hidden truth (Eco, Search 27). Kabbalah treats language as “a universe
unto itself” (Eco, “On Llull” 399), and attempts to discover truth encoded within the
Torah using acrostics, numerology, and endless anagrams.
Besides having its chapters metatextually structured around the ten emanations of
the Kabbalistic Sephirot, the story of Foucault’s Pendulum is explicitly laced with further
references to Kabbalah—primarily in the persons of Diotavelli and the computer
Abulafia. The first time Casaubon meets Diotavelli, Belbo emphasizes that (whether true
or not) Diotavelli thinks of himself as a practicing Jew, and, additionally is a practicing
Kabbalist (Pendulum 66). Diotavelli speaks often of the mythology of the Sephirot and
the Breaking of the Vessels, which grew out of late Kabbalistic mysticism (185). His
approval of playing with the Plan stems from his beliefs: “The rationality of history is the
result of a good recombining of the Torah. And that’s what we’re doing” (362).
Paradoxically, the character with the greatest philosophical interest is also the one who
first realizes its dangers. When, near the novel’s end, Diotavelli is stricken with cancer
and dying, he attributes it to the irresponsible nature of the Game. In a statement
reminiscent of the Corpus Hermeticum’s creed that “as above, so below,” Diotavelli
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gasps to Belbo: “[A]s the Torah, so a man’s body. [. . .] Rearranging the letters of the
book means rearranging the world. [. . .] And we anagrammatized all the books of
history, and we did it without praying” (466). Convinced that his cells have succumbed to
the wanton rewriting of the world, Diotavelli dies as the first intellectual casualty of the
Plan.
While a less-dramatic element, Abulafia is equally vital to the plot. Belbo’s
somewhat-primitive word processor, with capabilities probably quite similar to Wordstar
2000, in which Foucault’s Pendulum was composed (Eco, “How I Write” 332), Abulafia
is named after Abraham ben Samuel Abulafia, the thirteenth-century scholar whose
works on the names of God and the Prophetic Kabbalah were major landmarks of the
tradition (Edel 456), and, in Eco’s words, “took the art of combination to its utmost limit”
(“On Llull” 399). As a computer, Abulafia serves primarily as a means for the human
characters to reveal their inner thoughts. This happens both explicitly, as in Belbo’s diary
entries, and implicitly, as when Casaubon has to resort to psychoanalysis to guess
Belbo’s password. Casaubon says that Belbo used the computer with a “combinatory
passion” (Pendulum 21), medicating his own lack of creative faculty with an endless,
electronic play of other authors’ stories and characters. In the privacy of his digital
documents, Belbo can experiment and express without judgment or consequences.
Abulafia also facilitates the first germ of the Plan. When Belbo, Casaubon, and
Diotavelli first joke about throwing together a pastiche of conspiracies, they turn to the
computer to generate some random series of connections, using pre-loaded sets of
propositions and connective phrases. Belbo had already been experimenting with
combinatory poetry, so to play with the sequence of the world was merely a small step

AUCTOR IN FABULA

29

further: “All that’s needed is the data and the desire” (Pendulum 311). Though in itself
merely a combinatorial device—and thus more akin to the Ars Magna of Ramon Llull
(Eco, “On Llull” 397)—Abulafia is undeniably another textual connection to Kabbalah
and the hermetic.
Additionally, Eco has always been fascinated by the way that falsehood, the
discrepancy between thought and outside reality, can affect history and society. His
concept of culture as a shared ecosystem of propositions and societally-supported facts—
the cultural “Encyclopedia” (Eco, “Power” 274)—provides a framework for studying the
effects and interactions of true or false cultural units on the history of that culture.
History, as John Lukacs put it, becomes “a certain kind of memory” (Lukacs 246), and, in
keeping with Peircean methodology, the culture slowly verifies or disproves various units
of its collective memory, working toward a better and better Encyclopedia (Eco, “Power”
299). These fakes range from the benign, such as the American penchant for wax
museums (Eco, “Travels” 12-21), to the ecclesiastical, such as the spurious eighthcentury Donation of Constantine (Eco, “Power” 282), to the malicious, such as the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Eco, Six Walks 133-9). In every case, the assumption of a
falsehood as though it were true in the technical sense has repercussions similar to a
“real” proposition, until the culture can rewrite its Encyclopedia to reflect new findings.
In Foucault’s Pendulum, Eco explores the power of the fake specifically in
reference to the hermetic mind, and the way that a need for confirmation can sweep aside
any evidence for disbelief. The primary falsehood of the novel is, of course, the
counterfeit Plan of the Templars. Through rewriting history, the editors are playing with
both primary subjects of the overinterpretive mind: the world and human language.
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However, history cannot be empirically verified, and thus using history opens the editors
to the possibility of serious repercussions at the hands of those who take the lies
seriously. When Nesta Webster, “that inexhaustible source of anti-Semitic arguments”
(Eco, “Power” 292), wrote in the 1920s on the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, she
concluded that it managed to tell the truth about a global Jewish conspiracy despite
acknowledging its fictitious provenance (Eco, Six Walks 138). When Isaac Casaubon, the
sixteenth-century Protestant philologist, and the fictional Casaubon’s namesake (Eco,
“Intertextual Irony” 229), decisively concluded through linguistic science that the Corpus
Hermeticum could not be older than the Scriptures, Isaac Vossius and others of the
“lunatic fringe” stubbornly maintained that it was a mystic prophecy of Christ’s coming
(Grafton 89). Likewise, the Diabolicals of Foucault’s Pendulum will not accept fakery as
an excuse. As Lia, Casaubon’s less-credulous lover, puts it:
People believe those who sell lotions that make lost hair grow back. They
sense instinctively that the salesman is putting together truths that don’t go
together, that he’s not being logical, that he’s not speaking in good faith.
But they’ve been told that God is mysterious, unfathomable, so to them
incoherence is the closest thing to God. (Pendulum 444)
In the end, Belbo finally realizes that there is no way out of the falsehood. Telling the
truth will not convince those who were waiting for the lie: “They wouldn’t believe him.
His words were too undramatic, too simple. It was a revelation they wanted, on pain of
death” (468). The three editors may have treated history as rewritable, but their own
actions prove absolutely irrevocable.
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While it is clear at this point that Foucault’s Pendulum has direct, explicit
connections to historical hermeticism, to stop here would be to go no further than Richard
Rorty did, leading to a similar faulty reading. The next step in defending the hypothesis
regarding the novel’s intent is to establish a clear contrast between hermeticism and more
economical interpretation in the novel. Of such contrasts there are three primary
manifestations: the various treatments of the Message of Provins, the theories regarding
the significance of resemblances, and the perspectives on the concept of the Absolute.
While the Message of Provins may appear a minor plot point, its various
interpretations help drive the larger story in key ways. First brought to the editors’
attention by recurring Diabolical Colonel Ardenti, the Message constitutes little more
than a half-legible, coded note, supposedly found in a crypt in the French city of Provins.
The note, apparently a simple list of objects, is interpreted by Ardenti to be allegorically
detailing a master plan of the disbanded Templars: “If you know the history of the order,
it’s less obscure than it seems” (Pendulum 115). According to Ardenti, the list is a series
of steps which were to be completed by the various groups of undercover Templars,
moving toward the recovery of the Holy Grail (119). Being at the start of their long
journey, Casaubon, Belbo, and Diotavelli find all of this ridiculous, and send Ardenti on
his way.
Later, however, in the midst of the feverish Plan-concocting, Casaubon is
reminded by chance of Ardenti’s document. Having spent time studying all the
labyrinthine histories and theories of the Diabolicals, he begins to visualize ways that the
mysterious text could fit in to the grander scheme: “No longer was I laughing at the
message Ardenti had shown us” (Pendulum 319). Suddenly Casaubon and the other
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editors find that, using a modified form of Ardenti’s symbolic reading, they can structure
the whole of their Plan around the Provins message, involving “all the centers of Europe”
(321) and most of medieval and modern history in the scheme.
In direct opposition to this use of the Provins document stands Lia’s
interpretation. Not long before the Diabolicals hear about it, Casaubon tells Lia, his lover
and mother of his infant son, Giulio, about the grand project that he and his coworkers
have been assembling. To his surprise, she is more disappointed than impressed,
concerned that he and the others are toying with others’ beliefs when they should not.
Asking for a copy of the Message of Provins, Lia swiftly comes up with a counterinterpretation in only a couple days of research. Her theory is radically different: “It’s a
laundry list” (Pendulum 438). Using a Provins guidebook and some other resources, she
convincingly argues that the list of instructions is nothing more than a guide for a day’s
purchases and deliveries, and that the hay cart, roses, and stone have no deeper symbolic
meaning. Her reconstruction, guided by actual historical research about the location and
likely authors, presents a solution far more economical than either Ardenti’s or the
editors’ guesses. Casaubon is floored, but falls back on the game-like nature of the
project to defend his pride: “All right, we started out with a laundry list. Yet we were
clever enough, inventive enough, to turn a laundry list into poetry” (444). The levelheaded Lia remains unconvinced.
Another preeminent way that Eco contrasts the hermetic and economical is by
juxtaposing his characters’ stances on numerological similarities. When Colonel Ardenti,
ever the Diabolical poster child, is explaining his interpretation of the Provins document,
he spouts an endless series of numeric relationships, drawing connections between thirty-

AUCTOR IN FABULA

33

six, one hundred twenty, six hundred sixty-six, eighteen, nine, and other numbers of
“profound significance” (Pendulum 115). Diotavelli, out of the editors the most keen on
arithmetical symbolism, immediately responds in a tone half-encouraging, half-mocking:
Excuse me for butting in, but [. . .] thirty-six knights for each of the six
places makes two hundred and sixteen, the digits of which add up to nine.
And since there are six centuries, we can multiply two hundred and
sixteen by six, which give us one thousand two hundred and ninety six,
whose digits add up to eighteen, or three times six, or 666. (117)
Ardenti’s response is ecstatic: “It’s a revelation!” (118). For him, the infinite
relationships between mathematical entities become the most fruitful of all grounds for
overinterpretation. The world of numbers allows for a multi-dimensional labyrinth of
connections between objects, dates, and the numeric entities themselves, and the sheer
number of potential mathematical operations makes any connection possible. Tellingly,
Ardenti treats the metonymic potential of numerological connections as ends in
themselves. Nine is significant because it is the sum of the digits of thirty-six—but thirtysix is significant because its digits add to nine. There is no direction to this recursive
symbolism, merely the shadow of some great meaning that imbues each connection with
deferred significance. All things become signs, none are referents, and the more
connections that can be found, the more Ardenti is certain that his idea must be true.
Conversely, the ever-sensible Lia presents an opposing view. At a point when
Casaubon is struggling “to keep apart the world of magic and what today we call the
world of facts” (Pendulum 300), Lia gives him an alternate view. Her view on archetypes
and numerical significance is rooted solidly in the real world, and specifically in the
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body. She counts various attributes that correspond to the numbers one to ten: one for the
person, two for the eyes, ears, nostrils, three for the family, four limbs, five fingers, and
so on: “Just sticking with the body, you can get all the numbers you want” (303). For Lia,
the number nine is not significant because it is the sum of the digits of thirty-six, but
rather because it can signify the number of bodily orifices. Her view does not permit
Ardenti’s endless chains of signification, because she always returns to the real world of
her experience and roots the symbolic operations there. Another way of understanding
this is that Lia does not separate her experience from the thing-in-itself, focused as she is
on the intense reality of the world; reality and experience are one in her mind, and are
their own Absolutes, capable of being symbolized, but never of being symbols
themselves. She rejects the Nietzschean creed that there are no facts, “only
interpretations” (Nietzsche 139), in favor of the Peircean stance that signs are the means
to knowing facts.
The treatment of the Absolute, the primum signatum, the ultimate and final truth,
is the last primary way that Eco contrasts the life of symbols with a life of the real.
Several of his characters reference a need for something solid at the end of all the signs,
some Archimedean point from which all the lesser mobiles swing. Right at the book’s
opening but late in its fabula, as Casaubon is ensconcing himself in the Musée, he
ponders the nature of the titular pendulum, which is swinging before him:
The Pendulum told me that, as everything moved—earth, solar system,
nebulae and black holes, all the children of the great cosmic expansion—
one single point stood still: a pivot, bolt or hook around which the
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universe could move. [. . .] The only stable place in the cosmos, the only
refuge from the damnation of the panta rei. 6 (Pendulum 5)
The idea of the pendulum, the swinging weight hung from one fixed and immovable
point, enraptures Casaubon. Similarly, Belbo too feels “a desperate thirst for the
Absolute” (48), looking for some point from which to value his own cowardly and
melancholy self, some master scheme to blame for his own failures (513). His computer’s
password prompt is “Do you have the password?” to which the necessary answer is “No”
(37). At one point, Casaubon and Belbo discuss Foucault’s device—and Belbo viciously
attacks the illusion of stability: “If you detach it from the ceiling of the Conservatoire and
hang it in a brothel, it works just the same. [. . .] It promises the infinite, but where to put
the infinite is left to me” (201). Belbo hits here on the key difference between the novel’s
hermetics and its sensible people. For the overinterpretive and overeager, it matters little
where the Absolute is—in fact, the Absolute is nothing more than an afterthought, a
necessary link posited as a result of the great scheme of connections which can be moved
or changed at will. If the Plan can’t work with Jerusalem, then it must be centered on
Paris. If the Templars’ goal is not the Grail, then, by all means, substitute telluric
currents. The universe is “an infinite onion, which has its center everywhere and its
circumference nowhere” (514), subject to unpeeling at any location. There are no
consequences or mistakes, merely endless series of empty secrets.
In response to the infinite abstractions and symbolic worlds of the Diabolical
imagination, Eco presents, again, a staunchly realist and humanist perspective. Though
they do not realize until too late, Casaubon and Belbo encounter specific objects and

6

A tenet of Heraclitus’ philosophy: “everything flows.”

AUCTOR IN FABULA

36

moments of self-actualization and pure realitas that provide what the Pendulum refuses
to deliver. For Casaubon the counterpart to the seductive pseudo-structures of the Plan is
his infant son, Giulio. While the Plan is a magnum opus of the abstract, the hyperbolic,
and the contentless, Giulio is one of the concrete, a “grail” of flesh (Pendulum 365)
knitted via the anatomic alchemy of Lia’s womb. When he is born, Giulio is a touchstone
of real life, much like Lia; when Casaubon is awaiting death on the hillside, Giulio
becomes a hope for redemption, a proof that existence is not “so empty and fragile that it
can be endured only by the illusion of a search for its secret” (516). The baby is a
product, like the Plan, but is as far from the sterile abstraction of the Plan as can be
imagined. He embodies the infinite, the mysterious, the ineffable—without sacrificing the
truth of his being.
On the other hand, Belbo’s personal story is bookended by two encounters with
the Absolute—both rooted solidly in the world. Towards the close of the novel, Casaubon
recalls one of Belbo’s diary entries, recounting a childhood episode during the Second
World War. An instrumentalist as a young boy, Belbo was requested to perform bugle
calls at a burial. At the final moment of his melody, when all around have stilled and he
alone acts, he is enveloped in a sort of mystical experience:
He felt he was playing out a string that kept the sun in place. The planet
had been arrested in its course, had become fixed in a noon that could last
an eternity. And it all depended on Jacopo, because if he broke that
contact, dropped that string, the sun would fly off like a balloon, and with
it this day and the event of this day, this action without transition, this
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sequence without before and after, which was unfolding, motionless, only
because it was in his power to will it thus. (Pendulum 524)
This moment of intense being, when all things are tremendously and irrevocably
important, becomes a sort of Grail to Belbo throughout the rest of his life. Melancholy,
cynical, and self-deprecatory, unlucky both in love and business, Belbo embarks on the
Plan largely as an avenue to create something undeniably his own.
When the power of his falsehood inevitably proves too much to handle, Belbo is
brought to the brink of death—but the brink of death brings him to his second, longsought encounter. Captive in the Musée, bound and noosed, surrounded by throngs of
conspirators, occultists, and mystics demanding the final secret of the Plan, Belbo has
only to invent some further lie in order for his gullible captors to be convinced. Instead,
he refuses. Presented with a moment of utter invincibility (Pendulum 493), when all of
fate apparently hangs on his next action, Belbo chooses to refuse rather than capitulate. In
the scuffle that ensues, his prop is knocked away, and Belbo is hung by the Pendulum’s
own wire. At this, the moment is complete: Casaubon sees the double pendulum formed
by Belbo’s head and the metal plumb—the classic example of a chaotic system—resolve
itself, and for a single, eternal moment Belbo is “the point of suspension, the Fixed Pin,
the place from which the vault of the world is hung. [. . .] A single fearless act had
reconciled him with the Absolute” (495). Both moments, both in the cemetery and in the
Musée, were meaningful because they did not mean anything. In these two instants of
action, there was “no symbol, no sign, symptom, allusion, metaphor, or enigma” (525).
They were themselves, and only themselves. For the characters of Foucault’s Pendulum,
personal experience and the immanence of the real are the only things which can be
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invested with any ultimate significance. Meaning is in life itself: in the “fingers and toes”
of a newborn (371), in the moment a coward says no in the face of death, and in the way
that the velvet of a peach “makes shudders run from your tongue to your groin” (532).
The arcane promise of the Pendulum will ever be merely a distraction and a counterfeit.
Conclusion
It would be easy to personally fault Rorty for producing a bad interpretation of
Foucault’s Pendulum. But all that can really be said is that he was unable to become the
Model Reader, thanks to those philosophical presuppositions that he brought with him to
the reading. A reader ready to notice allusions and make more open-minded judgements
should close the cover with a sure sense of Eco’s philosophical consistency. While he
may indeed “emend [his] thinking constantly” (Eco, “On Symbolism” 140), the conflict
between good and bad interpretation has never left his writing. Though it is perhaps too
much to argue, as others have, that Lia, ever the voice of caution and wisdom, speaks
with Eco’s own voice (Eco, “Reading” 825), a contrast is indisputably presented between
her views and those of the editors and Diabolicals. The divide between her realism and
their “vicious abstractionism,” between the truth of experience and the falsehood of the
hermetic, is too deep, too all-encompassing, to be taken otherwise.
The presentation of such a humanist and realist perspective is fitting in the novel
of a man who loves life and human pleasures the way that Eco himself does. Drinker,
smoker, humorist, a man who enjoys actual sex more than the writing thereof (Zanganeh
“Art”), a critic who can be enamored of Nerval’s Sylvie after a hundred readings (Eco,
“Mists” 29), Eco seems to adhere to Alyosha Karamazov’s desire to “love life more than
the meaning of it” (Dostoevsky 242). Though an intensely abstract thinker, Eco’s
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concerns always return to the real, the consequential, the human: the question of how life
should be lived always trumps the need for absolute certainty regarding what life is. In
the face of a postmodern world, he proposes what he calls a “Negative Realism” as a
starting point for philosophy: the conviction that the universe does exist, has discoverable
limits, guidelines, and boundaries, and that, while ideas may be infinite, “there are some
things that would be crazy to say” (Eco, “Some Remarks”). Foucault’s Pendulum springs
directly from, and masterfully reflects, that conviction.
In a paper presented at the University of Castilla-La Mancha, Eco confessed to
having wanted to rewrite Bouvard et Pécuchet, Flaubert’s extravagant satire on spurious
academics (Eco, “Borges” 125). By painting a picture of interpretation gone wildly, even
horribly, awry, Eco has indeed succeeded in satirizing the methods of looking at the
world and language against which he has argued for decades. In place of hermeticism he
offers realism; in place of postmodern excesses he values economy; in place of chaos he
points out the evidence of order.
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